China and several other states are shaping the trajectory of Myanmar’s civil war through calibrated engagement with both the military junta and an array of rebel and opposition actors. Their policies are driven primarily by security, economic, and geopolitical interests rather than ideological alignment.
China’s engagement with the junta and border rebels
The People’s Republic of China has become one of the Myanmar military’s most significant external partners in the post‑coup period, providing arms, surveillance technologies, and economic support to the State Administration Council (SAC). Chinese companies and state entities remain closely linked to energy infrastructure and Belt and Road–related projects in Myanmar, giving Beijing strong incentives to maintain working relations with the junta as the recognized authority in Naypyidaw.
At the same time, China sustains longstanding relationships with several ethnic armed organizations operating along the China–Myanmar border. Beijing has hosted and brokered talks with groups such as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), pressing them to accept ceasefires or withdrawals from specific positions when their advances threaten Chinese infrastructure or trade routes. This approach enables China to hedge against sudden regime collapse while retaining leverage over both sides of the conflict.
Russian and regional backing for the junta
The Russian Federation has emerged as a key strategic partner for the junta, significantly expanding defense cooperation since the 2021 coup. Moscow has supplied combat aircraft and other military systems and has hosted high‑level visits by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, underscoring a relationship that provides the Myanmar military with advanced weaponry and political support in international forums.
Several regional states maintain functional ties with the SAC focused on border and security management. India engages the junta on issues including planned elections, cross‑border insurgent activity, and trade, balancing its security concerns in the northeast with its interest in limiting Chinese influence. Thailand and Bangladesh likewise coordinate with the junta over border stability, refugee flows, and informal trade, and their enforcement actions on frontier routes can affect the operational environment for armed resistance groups.
Western political support for the opposition
Western governments, led by the United States and the European Union, have adopted a largely oppositional stance toward the junta while avoiding direct arms transfers to rebel forces. Washington and European capitals have imposed targeted sanctions on junta leaders, military‑linked conglomerates, and state‑owned enterprises, and have expanded engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) as a principal political representative of the anti‑coup movement.
This backing includes diplomatic recognition in various forums and technical or financial support to civil society and governance initiatives aligned with the NUG and associated People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). However, the scale and nature of assistance remain more constrained than the overt military cooperation the junta receives from its state partners, leaving opposition forces heavily reliant on captured materiel, local production, and illicit cross‑border supply networks.
Indirect and informal support to rebel actors
Ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups benefit from fragmented enforcement along Myanmar’s borders, which allows weapons, supplies, and funding to move through informal channels. Local authorities and commercial actors in neighboring states may tacitly tolerate or selectively target these flows, resulting in indirect support that is more opportunistic than centrally directed.
