The ongoing civil war in Sudan erupted on April 15, 2023, from a power struggle between two military factions that had previously collaborated to overthrow longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and seize control from a civilian-led transitional government in 2021. As of early 2026, the conflict has caused tens of thousands of deaths, widespread displacement of over 11 million people (including millions internally and refugees in neighboring countries), and a severe humanitarian crisis with acute hunger affecting millions and famine risks in regions like Darfur and Kordofan. The war has fragmented Sudan, with shifting front lines leaving the country divided: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) control key eastern and central areas including much of Khartoum (retaken in 2025), while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) hold significant territory in western regions like Darfur and parts of Kordofan. It has involved ethnic militias, former rebel groups, and foreign powers, complicating resolution. Peace efforts, including mediation by regional and international actors, have repeatedly stalled, with recent proposals for ceasefires and truces facing rejection or limited progress amid ongoing escalation.
The Two Main Sides and Their Leaders
The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the official national military, against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group with origins in the Janjaweed militias from the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s. Tensions escalated over plans to integrate the RSF into the SAF as part of a transition to civilian rule, leading to open warfare.
- Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): The SAF is the formal military structure, including the army, air force, navy, and republican guard. It has regained control of much of Khartoum and surrounding areas through offensives in 2025, and holds eastern regions including Port Sudan. It has allied with some former rebel groups (such as factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement) and other militias. Leader: General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, de facto head of state and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council. A career military officer, Burhan was involved in the 2019 coup against Bashir and the 2021 coup against the civilian government.
- Rapid Support Forces (RSF): The RSF is a semi-autonomous paramilitary force formalized in 2013 under Bashir’s regime to counter rebellions, with roots in Darfur’s Janjaweed. It controls much of western Sudan, including Darfur and parts of Kordofan, and has established parallel governance structures there. It has alliances with other rebel factions and Arab militias. Leader: General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. A former camel trader from Darfur, Hemedti rose through Janjaweed ranks, gaining wealth from gold mining and mercenary activities (e.g., in Yemen and Libya). He was Burhan’s deputy after 2019 but split over power-sharing.
International Backers
Foreign involvement has prolonged the conflict, turning Sudan into a proxy arena over resources like gold, Nile water, and Red Sea access. Support includes arms, funding, logistics, and diplomatic aid, though many actors deny direct military involvement.
- Backers of the SAF (Burhan):
- Egypt: Primary supporter, providing military aid, training, and drones due to border concerns, Nile interests, and opposition to RSF influence.
- Iran: Supplies drones and equipment, aiding SAF gains.
- Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic and some military support, with mediation roles but tilting toward the SAF for regional stability.
- Qatar and Turkey: Ties to Islamist elements; provide drones and aid.
- Russia: Some backing through channels tied to gold interests.
- Backers of the RSF (Hemedti):
- United Arab Emirates (UAE): Main accused supporter, providing arms, funding, and logistics (via Chad and Libya) for economic interests in gold and regional influence.
- Chad: Allows arms transit and some support, linked to ethnic ties in Darfur.
- Ethiopia and Eritrea: Some military support and alliances.
- Russia (via historical Wagner ties): Fluctuating links through gold concessions.
Other actors like the U.S. and EU emphasize mediation, sanctions, and humanitarian efforts without direct military backing of either side.
Goals
Both sides seek control of Sudan, but their visions differ based on alliances and structures. Neither has demonstrated strong commitment to full civilian rule, and victory could lead to further fragmentation or authoritarian rule.
- If SAF Wins: Burhan aims for a military-led government with a managed transition to elections under SAF oversight, emphasizing centralized control and eliminating rivals. This could incorporate Islamist influences from alliances and strengthen ties to supporters like Egypt and Iran. The SAF has operated a “Hope Government” from Port Sudan (with recent moves toward Khartoum), focusing on national unity but prioritizing military dominance.
- If RSF Wins: Hemedti seeks consolidation, possibly through a more decentralized or federal system with regional autonomy, a bill of rights, and a unified army under RSF influence. The RSF has formed a “Government of Peace and Unity” in areas like Nyala and Darfur, promising secular governance but maintaining paramilitary control. Victory would likely bolster economic links with the UAE, exploit resources like gold, and address some Darfur issues, but risks deepening ethnic divisions and militia dominance.
